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Introduction 
Organization and organizing are best understood within specific cultural contexts, 
elite ideologies and national business systems (Boyer, 2005; Djelic, 1998; Goyer, 
2003; Hancké, 2001; 2002; Lubatkin et al., 2005). In the case of post-war France, the 
rise of the corporate economy was not the natural product of competitive pressures, 
but in many respects resulted from economic and social engineering on the part of the 
ruling elite, giving rise to a unique mode of capitalism (Maclean, 2002; Yoo and Lee, 
2009). The French business elite has tended to be unified across the public-private 
divide by common educational experiences, and by a shared ideology of national self-
interest (Dudouet and Joly, 2010; François, 2010; Mayer and Whittington, 1999). This 
contrasts with the UK, where top civil servants and company directors are essentially 
separate tribes; where the reproduction of the elite is arguably less organized and 
more haphazard, relying on the social ambition and networking skills of aspiring 
individuals; and where a name-changing honours system has the function of 
legitimizing the right of the elite to rule.  
This paper explores some of the distinctive features of business elites in 
France and considers the consequences for its modus operandi in relation to corporate 
strategy and organizational design. In particular, it is concerned with elite 
connectivity and concerted action by elite ‘connectors’. Three features stand out. 
These concern, first, the nexus of relations that exist between companies in the form 
of director interlocks (Burt et al., 2000; Yeo et al., 2003; François, 2010); second, the 
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significant participation of the State and other companies in the equity of leading 
firms, which brings with it an entitlement to representation on the boards (Morin, 
2000; Lubatkin et al., 2005); and third, the large number of elite actors with direct 
experience of working in an executive capacity in both the public and private sectors, 
in stark contrast to the UK (Bauer and Bertin-Mourot, 1997; Comet and Finez, 2010; 
Dudouet and Joly, 2010; Vernholes, 2001; Whittington et al., 1999; Whittington and 
Mayer, 2000). The involvement of the State is critical (Clift, 2007; Yoo and Lee, 
2009). We also consider in this paper examples of concerted action by elite 
connectors, as illustrated by the ‘expansion-protection dialectic’ which enables some 
large enterprises, like Electricité de France (EDF), to pursue ‘State-sponsored’ 
strategies for economic expansion abroad whilst enjoying a strong measure of 
protection at home – an issue which perplexes many foreign observers (Maclean et 
al., 2007; Tixier and Mauchamp, 2000; Vernholes, 2001; Wagner, 2011). The paper 
also touches on the ways in which French elites are currently experiencing ongoing 
identity transitions induced by internationalization (David and Mach, 2012; Davoine 
and Ravasi, 2013; Genieys, 2005; Hartmann, 2011). We adopt in the paper a Franco-
British comparative perspective, in recognition of our own national standpoint, and as 
part of our contribution to the purpose of this Special Issue, which is to fashion a 
contemporary understanding of French organization through the lens of international 
scholars; with the proviso that due to spatial constraints, this is not a full-blown 
comparison. We also imbue our analysis with a historical perspective, acknowledging 
our background as scholars of both organization studies and business history 
(Maclean et al, 2006; 2010). 
 This paper examines elite connectivity and concerted action by the ruling elite, 
investigating the proposition that the cohesive nature of French capitalism has helped 
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to make French business leaders proactive in their determination to fashion the rules 
of engagement for private enterprise within the framework of European and 
international economic systems; a situation which, notwithstanding, has arguably 
changed slightly in the course of the past decade (Clift, 2007; Genieys, 2005; 
Howarth, 2013; Loriaux, 2003). The paper is organized as follows. In the next section 
we consider in greater depth the nature of the ties that bind the French elite together, 
before reviewing the methodology on which this paper is based. Next we report some 
findings from our research, examining the nature of the ‘connectors’ who unite the 
business system. This is followed by a discussion of two illustrative vignettes selected 
as exemplars of concerted action by the ruling elite: the downfall of Jean-Marie 
Messier as a strategic deviant of the system, and EDF as epitomizing a French 
company pursuing State-sponsored expansion globally. We conclude by considering 
the implications of this for the adaptation of elite ideology in France. 
 
The French Business Elite: A Nexus of Relations 
The nature of the ties that bind members of elite business communities is a subject 
that has preoccupied scholars of social network research since the 1970s (Brass et al., 
2004; Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 1992; Oh et al., 2004; Palmer et al., 1986; 
Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997; Scott, 2000; Sun et al., 2012). According to this 
perspective, the firm is a social unit of analysis (Granovetter, 1992), the primary focus 
being on relations between actors, whether individuals, work units or corporate 
entities, which are ‘embedded within networks of interconnected relationships that 
provide opportunities for and constraints on behavior’ (Brass et al., 2004: 795). The 
intersection of these relationships determines the centrality of an actor as a connector 
in a group.  
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With a relatively small number of exceptions, few studies of the ties that bind 
elite business members are cross-national and comparative (Davis et al, 2003; Useem, 
1982; Scott, 1991; Windolf, 1998; Burt et al., 2000; Yoo and Lee, 2009), and 
relatively few (at least by international observers) concern France (Coignard and 
Guichard, 2000; Comet and Finez, 2010; Dudouet and Joly, 2010; François, 2010; 
Hamdouch, 1989; Harvey and Maclean, 2008; Maclean et al., 2010; Yeo et al., 2003 ; 
Yoo and Lee, 2009). Burt et al. (2000) present France, in their study of the social 
capital of French and American managers, as a rich site for comparative research, 
because of the traditional image of French organizations as possessing strong social 
boundaries between insiders and outsiders (Suleiman, 1978; Bourdieu, 1986, 1996), 
and of French managers as being strongly regulated by bureaucratic authority 
(Crozier, 1963; Courpasson, 2000; Courpasson et al., 2012): ‘People comfortable with 
knowing their place in a chain of bureaucratic control could be uncomfortable with 
the negotiated control exercised by network entrepreneurs’ (Burt et al., 2000: 123). 
While elite networking in the two countries has much in common, with both French 
and British business elites networking across a range of charitable institutions, public 
bodies, business associations and educational institutions as well as sports and arts 
charities. Nevertheless, our own analysis suggests that elite networking has 
traditionally been achieved very differently in France and the UK, despite some 
obvious similarities. British elites are regularly, though not always, nurtured in a 
range of public schools and elite universities, Oxbridge especially helping to provide 
a natural entrée into the corridors of power. This said, those seeking careers in 
banking and accountancy in Britain have regularly sought recognized professional 
qualifications from bodies like the Institute of Chartered Accountants and the 
Chartered Institute of Bankers instead. Involvement in charities is significantly more 
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widespread among the British elite than it is among their French counterparts. 
Likewise, UK directors are almost twice as likely to be involved with sports or arts 
institutions. On the other hand, French elite members are more likely to serve on the 
boards of business associations, such as industry bodies in motor vehicles or 
aerospace. While the ties that bind the French business elite tend to be institutional 
and strong, those that unite the business elite in Britain are in part social in nature and 
tend to be relatively weak (cf. Granovetter, 1973). In France, networking, we suggest, 
has tended to be an institutional feature, systemically embedded, sustained and 
supported by the State (Comet and Finez, 2010; Yoo and Lee, 2009); whereas in the 
UK the onus is not on institutions but on individuals.  
Comparing France with the US, Burt et al. (2000: 141) have established that 
successful French managers, like successful American managers, ‘tend to have 
networks rich in structural holes’. Structural holes, conceived by Burt (1992), are 
essentially indirect connections in a network which, if bridged, can furnish a distinct 
advantage (Collins-Dogrul, 2012; Zaheer and Bell, 2005). Burt et al. (2000: 141) 
explain this as follows:  
‘the brokerage principle in network theory… says that there is a competitive 
advantage to building bridge relationships. Whether in the United States or 
France, resources flow disproportionately to people who provide indirect 
connections between otherwise disconnected groups’.  
 
Nevertheless, social capital, they found, emerges differently in France and the 
US, a difference which Frank and Yasumoto (1998) attribute to the importance of 
particularistic obligations in France, where social capital is pursued through 
‘enforceable trust’ rather than ‘reciprocity transactions’. ‘Enforceable trust’, as Portes 
and Sensenbrenner (1993: 1325) explain, is the means by which ‘social capital is 
generated by individual members’ disciplined compliance with group expectations’. 
Actors are more likely to pursue enforceable trust where the social structure is dense. 
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Coleman (1988) posits that actors in dense networks, in which common norms of 
behaviour are likely to develop, can rely on sanctions against hostile acts and 
opportunism (Zaheer and Bell, 2005). Confirming this density of social structure, Burt 
et al. (2000) found the French firm to have a less porous boundary surrounding it than 
the American firm. In France, relationships that cut across lines of bureaucratic 
control, the very stuff of social capital, are eschewed (Crozier, 1964). In the densely 
knit structure of elite French business circles, friendships are important (Kadushin, 
1995; Yeo et al., 2003). In a more closed group or subgroup, united by strong, 
positive ties, available information tends to be homogenous and redundant. This may 
make unity of outlook and policy more likely (Mills, 1956: 123), in the form of 
‘groupthink’ (‘la pensée unique’) (Whyte, 1989). Jean-René Fourtou, former PDG of 
Rhône-Poulenc and Vivendi-Universal, underlines the importance of having space to 
think:  
‘Le vide [void] has a huge function in organizations… Shock comes when 
different things meet. It’s the interface that’s interesting… If you don’t leave 
le vide, you have no unexpected things, no creation… You can try to design 
for everything, or you can leave le vide and say, ‘I don’t know either; what do 
you think?’’ (cited in Burt et al., 2000: 129). 
 
The issue of trust, enhanced by close ties and prior networking, is important, 
shifting actors’ motivations from the narrow pursuit of self-interest towards more 
collective concerns (Coleman, 1988; Powell, 1990), echoing the views of the Swiss 
philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau ([1762]1966) regarding the supremacy of the 
‘general will’, which permits no particularistic viewpoints (Maclean, 2002). The 
sentiments expressed in Rousseau’s Social Contract remain pertinent to the present 
context. In this, Rousseau considers how individual citizens can inhabit society 
harmoniously, arguing that individuals should dispense with their individual 
motivations to submit instead to the ‘general will’ (la volonté générale) of the 
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integrated community (le moi commun), which allows no diversity of viewpoints. In 
this sense, the network serves as a social boundary of demarcation, mutually 
supportive while simultaneously being prepared to punish opportunistic behaviour.  
 
Methodology 
This paper explores elite connectivity and concerted action in France, examining the 
proposition that French capitalism comprises a distinctive set of social relations, 
founded on relationships between constituent agencies and on a particular concordat 
between State and business, by which it is conditioned and structured. The research 
underpinning this article stems from a wider cross-national, comparative project on 
business elites and corporate governance in France and the UK conducted by the 
authors since 1999 (Maclean et al., 2006; 2010). This has three dimensions. The first 
is quantitative and has involved the creation of a database of the 2,291 French and 
British directors of the Top 100 French and UK companies in post on 1st January 1998 
(1,241 sat on French boards, 1,031 on UK boards, and 19 on boards in both France 
and the UK). Data were gathered on social origins, education, qualifications, sporting 
and cultural pursuits, networks inside and outside business, careers and career 
trajectories between 1998 and 2004 (Maclean et al., 2014). The second dimension is 
qualitative and based on an on-going programme of life-history interviews conducted 
with members of the business elites of France and the UK. These interviews are in-
depth and extensive, typically lasting between one and two hours and generating 
transcripts of between 8,000 and 15,000 words. Elite interviews of this kind are hard 
to secure and most often require a personal recommendation (Pettigrew, 1992). We 
have conducted 51 such interviews thus far. The third dimension is the development 
of longitudinal case studies based on quantitative and qualitative data of leading 
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French and UK companies. Some quantitative data are taken from subscription 
financial databases; others are abstracted from annual reports and accounts. These are 
stored in the project database. Qualitative data are gathered from company histories, 
annual reports, corporate publications, grey literature and newspaper reports.  
 We describe our approach to data gathering as ‘focused, extensive and rooted 
in context’, broadly similar to that adopted by Pierre Bourdieu and underpinning each 
of his major works (1986; 1996). Our general interest in how national business 
systems evolve and adapt to changing circumstances, and the role played by members 
of the business elite in coordination and direction in concert with others operating 
within what Bourdieu refers to as the ‘field of power’ (Bourdieu, 1996; 2011; Denord 
et al., 2011; François, 2010), the integrative domain at the pinnacle of society that 
brings together elite actors from different walks of life. From this general perspective, 
we explore more specific issues of theoretical and practical importance relating to the 
accumulation and exercise of power by business elites, drawing selectively on the 
research resources available to us. In this paper, we draw upon a large subset (1,160 
members of the French elite on which we have extensive data) of the project database 
relating to the connectivity of the French business elite, identifying those actors who 
serve as connectors within and beyond the business world. We then focus upon two 
specific cases, the first relating to an individual actor and the second to an 
organization – namely, the demise of Jean-Marie Messier, and the internationalization 
of EDF. These were selected as vignettes which epitomize and aptly demonstrate how 
members of the elite are able to act in concert to safeguard the integrity of the French 
business model while pursuing international expansion, achieving closure, and at the 
same time adapting to the exigencies of the moment. 
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Exploring Elite Connectivity 
Higher Education and the French Elite 
In studying the French and British business communities, we have found elite 
cohesion to be achieved very differently in the two countries. In France, networking is 
supported and facilitated by the State through august State institutions, dominated by 
a small group of schools and universities where future elites develop personal and 
social ties, foremost among which are the prestigious grandes écoles. These are 
dominated by Polytechnique (dubbed ‘X’) and the Ecole Nationale d’Administration 
(ENA), the elite national college of public administration, as well as the Institut 
d’Etudes Politiques de Paris (IEP, known as ‘Sciences-Po’), and the Ecole des Hautes 
Etudes Commerciales (HEC) (Denord et al., 2011; Eymeri, 2001; Hartmann, 2000). 
Sciences-Po often functions as a launch-pad to ENA, with a strong student overlap 
characterizing these two schools, while Polytechnique and ENA prepare students for 
the higher civil service. As a sign of the growing internationalization of the French 
elite, Harvard Business School also features on the list of sought-after establishments 
(see Table 1). Oxford and Cambridge arguably hold similarly hegemonic positions; 
but the concentration in French elite establishments is significantly higher when the 
numbers graduating are considered: several thousand graduate from Oxbridge every 
year, but far fewer from Polytechnique. The State also serves as a facilitator of 
connections through the grands corps, the pinnacle of France’s civil service elite 
which recruit from amongst the leading students graduating from the grandes écoles, 
membership of which is a mark of inclusion at the very top of France’s civil service 
elite (Bourdieu, 1996; Yoo and Lee, 2009). The grands corps include the Inspection 
des Finances, the Corps des Mines and the Cour des Comptes. The State also binds 
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elite members together through key organs of government, especially the Treasury, as 
well as ministerial Cabinets.  
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
Like the grandes écoles, the grands corps foster an esprit de caste, resembling 
forms of extended family or freemasonry (Barsoux and Lawrence, 1990). Suleiman 
(1978: 197) describes the grands corps as ‘placement bureaux’, commenting that no 
one ever entered the Inspection des Finances to inspect finance, or the Corps des 
Mines for a career in mining. As Bourdieu observes, the grands corps consecrate 
social identities that are both in competition with and complementary to one another, 
such that, despite the rivalry between individual corps, all corpsards are ‘united by a 
genuine organic solidarity’ (1996: 142). The solidarity of elite privilege is also 
conferred by membership of exclusive clubs, in particular the Club du Siècle 
(Hartmann, 2011). This notion of the State as a facilitator of elite ties is not 
encountered in the UK. As many as 27% of top French directors included in our 
sample moved from the public to the private sector, i.e. they began their career 
working for the French State and subsequently moved into private enterprise. 
 
Corporate Connectors 
French companies place a high value on the connectivity that comes from being part 
of a dense social network. Interlocking directorships serve as ties binding the French 
national business system together, the mean number of top 100 directorships held by 
members of the business elite in 1998 being 2.73. If all directorships are considered, 
including companies outside the top 100, this figure rises to 3.75 (Maclean et al., 
2006). Our research has revealed the top 100 French companies to be significantly 
more interlocked than their British counterparts, the top five French enterprises 
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featuring an average of 39.6 interlocks. The Président-Directeur Généraux (PDG), 
who perform the combined roles of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, of top 
companies are amongst the heavily used instruments of formal networking, routinely 
sitting on the boards of numerous allied companies (Alcouffe and Alcouffe, 1997; 
Comet and Finez, 2010; François, 2010; Yeo et al., 2003). The State has played a very 
specific role in institutionalizing these relationships (Yeo and Lee, 2009). At the time 
of privatization (which took place in several waves from 1986 onwards), elite 
solidarity was bolstered by the creation of ‘hard cores’ of stable shareholders, often 
built on long-standing relationships, as State actors capitalized on extant networks to 
ensure that controlling stakes remained in safe hands (Bauer, 1988; Maclean, 1995, 
2008). While the noyaux durs may have unravelled substantially since the mid-1990s, 
the relationships on which they were based often endure, cemented by interlocking 
directorships (Clift, 2004; 2007). 
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to think of the French business elite as 
monolithic and homogenous. A more accurate representation is that the elite has a 
number of defining characteristics, but at the same time is relatively diverse in several 
crucial aspects. The upper echelon of the French business system, like many others, is 
largely a male preserve (96% in 1998), is mainly composed of people born and bred 
in the country (88% in 1998), is drawn predominantly from people from upper and 
upper-middle class backgrounds (62% in 1998), and is highly educated (96% to first 
degree level, 71% to master’s degree level and 10% holding a doctorate  in 1998) in 
elite institutions (75% in 1998). This picture has changed little over recent decades 
(Comet and Finez, 2010; Martinache, 2011). However, alongside these similarities 
there are also interesting differences. Members of the elite may be educated and work 
in Paris, but they are drawn there from all parts of France. Moreover, as French 
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business has internationalized, significant minorities are gradually but increasingly 
being appointed to French boards from Belgium, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, 
the UK and the USA (Davoine and Ravasi, 2013; Harvey and Maclean, 2010; 
Wagner, 2011). Likewise, while science, engineering and mathematics (36% in 1998) 
and law, business, economics and management (53% in 1998) are the two main 
higher education platforms for business elite careers, there is considerable subject 
variation within those broad categories.  
This pattern of pronounced similarities is counterbalanced by equally 
pronounced differences, and progressive changes can be seen in many aspects of elite 
selection and career development (Davoine and Ravasi, 2013). Table 1 confirms that 
graduation from an elite higher education institution is the norm for those who 
progress to the top in French business. Moreover, the degree of concentration in 
attendances even within the set of elite grandes écoles and universities is noteworthy, 
with 52% of all attendances being at just one of ten institutions. It remains common, 
as mentioned, to progress from one elite higher education institution to another, and 
for scientists, engineers and mathematicians to progress to study economics, business, 
management or social sciences at postgraduate level. Those wishing to work for the 
State for some time and having sufficiently high grades might gain admission to ENA. 
Others might work in business for a few years and then apply to a prestigious business 
school at home or abroad such as Harvard, Stanford, ESSEC or INSEAD. The 
curricula these schools offer reflect the diverse knowledge needed to lead and manage 
successfully in global enterprises, including the study of international political 
economy and cross-cultural management, alongside more traditional business school 
subjects. The emphasis on integrated learning, engagement with practice and 
practitioners, problem solving and decision making increasingly has been picked up 
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from leading US schools by elite institutions in France, including institutions with a 
primarily technological identity, such as the Ecole des Mines de Paris. 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Having an elite education of one type or another is virtually a necessary 
condition of reaching the pinnacle of French business, but it is by no means sufficient. 
Even though the numbers attending elite institutions is relatively small, when set 
against the total number of university and college graduates, there is still a surfeit of 
individuals with the most prized qualifications from the supposedly best places. To 
get to the top in corporate France much more is needed (Maclean et al., 2014). In 
Table 2 we present the results of our analysis by director type and corporate 
connectivity of the main board directors of France’s top 100 companies in 1998. This 
is revealing in two main aspects. First, it demonstrated that the composition of the 
business elite is functionally diverse. As many as 854 of the 1,160 member of the elite 
are corporate executives, divided almost equally between those who serve a single 
company and those who connect the company they serve as an executive with others. 
These corporate connectors add value to firms within their corporate network through 
knowledge exchange, calibration against norms, developing consensus and the 
initiation of collaboration or joint action in relation to common threats or 
opportunities. The remaining three types of director within the business elite 
constitute small but substantial minorities. One group is made up of people non-
executives who serve a single company. Some of these are former executives who 
remain on the board after retirement, others are specialists who bring expertise from 
different walks of life, and others are shareholder representatives, quite often senior 
members of family-owned firms. A second group is composed of senior public 
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servants who represent the interests of government on the boards of firms in which the 
State has retained a significant shareholding. These people are the ‘eyes and ears’ of 
officialdom, directly connecting the State with the business sector. The third group is 
composed of non-executives who serve more than one company. Typically these are 
people who prolong their careers following retirement from executive responsibility 
and who are prized as advisors, communicators and influencers, often within the 
political realm. The second main point emerging from Table 2 is that the degree of 
connectivity varies considerably between the connectors within the business elite. A 
majority of State representatives sits on just a single board, although a sizeable 
minority have more extensive networks, connecting between two and four boards. 
Just one of them is in the super corporate connector class of five or more boards. This 
class is made up of just over 9% of the business elite drawn mainly from the ranks of 
executive and non-executive networker directors. Of the 105 super corporate 
connectors identified, near three-quarters of these are executive networkers, the ultra-
powerful individuals who dominate the French corporate system, typically the chief 
executives of the largest companies who are invited to join the boards of other pillars 
of the French business establishment (Comet and Finez, 2010; Denord et al., 2011; 
Dudouet and Joly, 2010; François, 2010). 
 
Boundary Spanners 
Further and richer insights concerning the connectivity of the French business elite 
emerge from the analysis presented in Table 3. In this, the French business elite is 
divided by into six categories by primary current association: French business 
(77.4%), international (non French) business (9.9%), banking and finance (5.2%), law 
and other professions (0.7%), politics and public administration (5.6%), and academia 
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(1.2%). This distribution suggests that French business is far from being a ‘closed 
shop’. The supposed interpenetration between State and business elites is confirmed, 
reinforcing the fact that a high proportion of those whose power base is now within 
the business sector were once employed by the State. However, the extent to which 
French companies have welcomed foreign nationals on to their boards as they have 
extended their international reach is less well known (Davoine and Ravasi, 2013; 
Hartmann, 2011; Wagner, 2011). Likewise, growth at home and abroad, often through 
mergers and acquisitions, has required the close support of the investment banks, 
leading to their partners and senior employees being appointed to numerous corporate 
boards. The appointment to boards of a small number of individuals from the law, 
academia (scientists and economists) and other professions is interesting, reflecting an 
appreciation of the specialist talents of top people within those fields. 
 It can be observed that individuals with different power bases bring with them 
their own network of connections within and without the corporate world, widening 
the potential sphere of access and influence available to Top 100 companies. At any 
one time, a director will likely have a portfolio of appointments to boards, advisory 
groups, government commissions, representative bodies and the like. The value of 
boundary spanners lies in knowing from the inside what is going on in high places, 
and how to access influencers and decision makers (Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 
1997). Charities, public bodies, business associations, educational institutions, 
sporting clubs and cultural organizations are all places where participation in 
governance makes for connection within the field of power (Bourdieu, 2011). The 
mingling of elites in diverse settings helps to attune minds and inform a consensus as 
a basis for concerned action. Table 3 confirms just how well connected are those with 
a power base in international business and banking and finance (Howarth, 2013; 
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Kadushin, 1995). It demonstrates also the reach of the business class into the public 
sphere, and the connectivity of the elite in the governance of business associations. 
The connectivity of the business elite with higher education, most often with schools 
attended, serves to reinforce the hegemony and ideological unity imparted by the most 
prized French educational institutions (Comet and Finez, 2010; Dudouet and Joly, 
2010; Eymeri, 2001; Yoo and Lee, 2009). 
 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
Concerted Action by the French Business Elite 
The notable connectivity of the French business elite enables it to work in concert to 
promote and protect the French business model around the world. In what follows, we 
provide two illustrations of such concerted action, firstly by a group of connectors 
acting in unison, and secondly by State-sponsored expansion on the part of energy 
giant EDF. Both examples are intended to shed light on the French business elite’s 
response to globalization and the development of international business (Davoine and 
Ravasi, 2013; Wagner, 2011). 
 
Jean-Marie Messier 
Our research has yielded evidence of different patterns and preferences among the 
connector communities of France and Britain respectively. Using Kadushin’s data 
(1995), Frank and Yasumoto (1998) investigated the notion of ‘enforceable trust’ 
among the French financial elite, revealing the systematic avoidance of hostile acts on 
the part of members of cohesive subgroups. Just as hostile takeovers are uncommon in 
France, as exemplified by the concerted move to prevent the hostile takeover of 
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Danone by Pepsi in 2005 in reputed defence of the national interest (Clift, 2007), 
hostile acts against individuals are likewise eschewed; only 15 hostile acts being 
identified over a 15 year period (1980-1995). An example of one such hostile act from 
our own research is furnished by the removal from office of the CEO of Vivendi-
Universal, Jean-Marie Messier, in 2002. Messier had already substantially alienated 
the French establishment in 2001, when, as head of one of the world’s largest media 
and entertainment giants, he tactlessly announced the death of the French ‘cultural 
exception’. This concerns the enduring State support for the French film industry, 
perceived as battling against the hegemony of Hollywood, which France had fought 
tooth and nail to defend in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations (General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). Photographs of Messier taken in the company’s 
apartment off New York’s Central Park published in the pages of Paris Match at the 
time seemed to suggest that he had become overly American, seemingly ‘going 
native’. Following his multi-million spending spree in spring 2002, which brought 
Vivendi to its knees amid debts of €33 billion, the French business community acted 
in concert to remove Messier from office. The eight French directors on the board of 
Vivendi-Universal, who had initially backed him in the face of opposition from five 
US directors, withdrew their support. As the former CEO of a large French 
engineering company explained in a personal interview:  
‘A lot of French businessmen were thinking that the time had come to end the 
story… The reputation of the country was at stake, and that of the French 
stock market, especially as a consequence of the involvement of Americans in 
the story.’  
 
Messier conforms to Geletkanycz and Hambrick’s notion of the ‘strategic 
deviant’, a non-conformist who runs the risk of being ‘incompatible – left out of an 
intricately interconnected commercial web’ (1997: 676). The French do not sacrifice 
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elite members lightly. Prior to being ousted from office, Messier had been granted the 
sustained support of Vivendi’s French directors over many months, and awarded the 
Légion d’Honneur. In France, the prevalence of the ‘ties that bind’ signifies that 
members of the business elite demonstrate considerable ‘class solidarity’ (Comet and 
Finez, 2010; Martinache, 2011), in recognition of a shared class-based ‘habitus’ 
(Bourdieu, 1986; Hartmann, 2000), and consequently are less exposed on the grounds 
of poor personal performance than their counterparts in the UK. However, in a 
symbolic catharsis and affirmation of group identity and values, when action is taken 
it tends to be decisive (Turkle, 1975). Messier acutely resented the part played by 
Claude Bébéar, then PDG of AXA, in his fall from grace. In his book, Mon vrai 
journal, Messier (2002) relates a conversation between Bébéar and other business 
leaders which is reputed to have taken place at a Franco-Welsh rugby match in 
Cardiff: ‘[Messier] represents a danger to the marketplace of Paris, and to France’s 
image abroad’, Bébéar is reported to have said. ‘We must act, we must have his scalp’ 
(Maclean et al., 2006). 
 
EDF 
The case of EDF provides a salient example of concerted action driven by the ruling 
elite, and the kind of State support from which French utilities typically benefit, their 
pan-European and global strategies being supported at home by closed and quasi-
monopolistic markets, often in direct contravention of European Union (EU) 
directives. EDF was born in 1946 in the immediate aftermath of World War II, with 
the amalgamation and nationalization of French utility companies. Guaranteed 
nationwide energy supplies were seen as quintessential to economic recovery. As de 
later Gaulle (1960: 98) insisted,  
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‘The country’s activity depended on coal, electricity, gas and petroleum, and 
would eventually depend on atomic fission… Expenditure and efforts were 
necessary, therefore, which only the state was in a position to realize’.  
 
The decision to develop nuclear power was taken in 1955, but little was done until the 
1973 Yom Kippur War strengthened government resolve; construction of six nuclear 
energy plants commenced in 1974 and a further seven the following year. These were 
built with alacrity. In stark contrast to the UK, where the development of nuclear 
energy fuelled widespread public protest, the French nuclear programme aroused only 
muted resistance, greeted by general public recognition of the need for a secure 
national energy supply. It was a source of national pride when, in the 1980s, France 
became self-sufficient in electricity thanks to the nuclear programme, and began 
exporting electricity to other countries, including oil-rich Britain. When other 
European countries scaled down or stopped their nuclear plant construction 
programmes following Chernobyl in 1986, the French accelerated construction. EDF 
promoted nuclear energy at the time in a televised advertisement campaign depicting 
a sole pair of ballroom dancers surrounded by pairs of fighting boxers in a ring, 
demonstrating that France was not afraid of being different. 
French electricity production expanded considerably in the 1980s, benefiting 
from the considerable cost reductions derived from cheap nuclear energy. Self-
sufficiency in energy is a prodigious achievement for a country with little gas and 
almost no oil. The pursuit and ultimate achievement of self-sufficiency was the 
French reaction to the oil crisis, which in the 1970s had sent the country reeling into a 
decade-long recession. The contrast with the UK, which from 1975 benefited from 
North Sea oil, now largely depleted, is startling. With self-sufficiency in energy 
acquired, EDF and its fellow State monopoly, Gaz de France (GDF), set about 
capturing international markets through export and acquisition. Despite partial 
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privatization, both continued to benefit from State ownership coupled with closed, de 
facto monopolistic markets at home. This protected position allowed them to take full 
advantage of market liberalization elsewhere in the EU with relative impunity, to the 
deep resentment of energy producers in neighbouring EU member states, such as 
Germany, Spain and the UK.  
In 1996, EDF’s PDG, Edmond Alphandéry, addressed a conference marking 
its fiftieth anniversary. The energy supplier, he announced, would remain in the State 
sector. His discourse reiterated the sentiments expressed by de Gaulle in nationalizing 
the company half a century earlier: ‘EDF identified almost perfectly with the spirit of 
the Liberation and the Reconstruction … Fifty years after its birth, EDF is more than 
ever the instrument of the nation’ (cited in Hecht, 1998: 326, our emphasis). 
Similarly in 1996, the EU electricity directive on market liberalization took 
effect, as a result of which other EU member states broke up their electricity 
industries. France chose not to do so. On the contrary, EDF embarked on a strategy of 
international expansion, acquiring assets (power stations and physical 
interconnectors) in the EU together with customers (supply businesses). Its primary 
European export markets included Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Switzerland, 
Andorra and the UK. Further afield it supplied a growing customer base in Asia, 
Africa and South America. By the end of the millennium, EDF had become the 
second largest electricity producer in the world, possessing the greatest export 
capacity of any EU electricity generator; yet the domestic electricity market remained 
the least open in the EU. As a public-sector monopoly, EDF benefited from the 
tutelage of the State, including financial support and credit guarantees (Tixier and 
Mauchamp, 2000). The cost of capital advantage which it derived from State 
ownership should not be underestimated, raising money for acquisitions at a rate of 
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interest lower than government bond rates, while its private-sector European rivals 
could do no better than central bank base rates. Formerly these competitors included 
in their number British Energy. Today, following its delisting in 2009, British Energy 
is now subsumed into EDF Energy. EDF’s assets include, in the UK, London 
Electricity and SWEB, as well as generation assets such as Sutton Bridge power 
station. It purchased the rights to control the flows of electricity throughout 
continental Europe, bought up the interconnectors that link France to the UK, France 
to Spain, and so on. It acquired the interconnectors that join continental Europe to 
external electricity systems such as Eastern Europe and the Nordic countries. At the 
time of writing, EDF Energy is poised to build four new nuclear power stations in the 
UK. The company is currently running a new advertising campaign on British 
television, to the tune of a 1980 pop song by Fern Kinney entitled ‘Together we are 
beautiful’. As the songstress sings, ‘He walked into my life, and now he’s taken over. 
And it’s beautiful, yes it’s beautiful…’ 
In summary, EDF has used government finance terms to acquire assets abroad, 
engaging in a strategy of State-funded international expansion. It has been operating 
since the mid-1990s in commercial spheres, but not on always commercial terms, 
being (until 2005) without shareholders to satisfy. Its expansion abroad has been 
supported by protection at home, coupled with unrivalled access to low cost capital. It 
is a formidable combination and a unique source of competitive advantage. French 
attachment to protectionism within the energy sectors stands in flagrant contradiction 
to its professed aspirations for European construction. As Vernholes (2001) observes, 
‘It is incoherent to rejoice that a firm such as EdF should control a large part of 
electricity distribution in London while refusing – or deferring – reciprocity on 
national territory on the pretext of protecting the general interest which depends on a 
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public monopoly’. French interpretation of EU legislation on the liberalization of 
energy markets has been belated and minimalist. Its partial privatization in 2005 saw 
just 15% sold off. Interestingly, the motivation behind the sell-off was the need to 
raise a further €7 billion to finance its continuing expansion abroad. Today, EDF is 
the world’s largest electric utility provider. The stark contrast with the British position 
was aptly summed up by London Mayor Boris Johnson (2010), who remarked:  
‘You know, sometimes I don’t understand what’s wrong with us. This is just 
about the most creative and imaginative country on earth – and yet sometimes 
we just don’t have the gumption to exploit our intellectual property. We split 
the atom, and now we have to get French and Korean scientists to help us 
build nuclear power stations… Whatever we invent, from the jet engine to the 
internet, we find that someone carts it off and makes a killing from it 
elsewhere’. 
 
This State-sponsored strategy pursued by EDF has proved highly effective for 
manipulating the rules of the game, highlighting two key characteristics of French 
organization. The first concerns the readiness of the State and its ruling elite to 
manage the competitive landscape in favour of French organizations, in spite of 
liberalization (Maclean, 2002; Howarth, 2013); while the second entails elite cohesion 
which serves the collective interests of French business, and which is institutionally 
embedded and served in turn by the State (Maclean et al, 2006). Yoo and Lee (2009) 
describe this as ‘state-activist capitalism’. The case of EDF suggests that the most 
daring and ambitious of State-sponsored strategies can also be, at times, the most 
successful. It also implies that elite ideologies in France have deviated relatively little 
from sentiments expressed by Rousseau and de Gaulle concerning the primacy of the 
national interest and the conviction that firms can serve as an (expansionist) 
instrument of the nation. 
The Messier case, on the other hand, illuminates the pattern and practice of 
close relationships among the French business elite. It demonstrates how a strategy of 
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expansion may fall short and come unstuck when it is not grounded in the customary 
modes of business regulation. While Messier’s educational background 
(Polytechnique and ENA) fully conformed to the dominant profile of French business 
elites as identified above, nevertheless the strategy he pursued both contravened the 
established tradition of State interventionism in cultural and entertainment industries 
and collided with the informal hierarchies resulting from the centrality of other key 
players, such as Bébéar. This implies that the rules of the expansion-protection 
strategy may be endogenously restrictive. 
 
Conclusion 
The ties that bind French connectors tend to be institutional and strong (Yoo and Lee, 
2009). Networking in France is an institutional feature, we suggest, systemically 
embedded, whilst in the UK networking is left to ambitious, aspiring individuals. 
Transaction costs in a socially based system are arguably higher than in an 
institutionally based system. System-wide efficiency in the production and 
reproduction of business elites is not achieved in the UK. Whereas in France the 
system is geared towards providing future members of a highly selected, well-
educated elite to run the State and its leading companies, in the UK the onus is not on 
institutions but individuals. The latter is more haphazard and more wasteful, 
depending primarily on the social ambition and networking skills of aspiring 
individuals.  
 Despite the more ‘hit and miss’ nature of British connectivity, the more 
diverse, socially oriented, heterogeneous relationships in which British connectors 
engage may also have some benefits. Greater porosity surrounding the organization 
can lead to greater entropy. French connectors display a preference for more 
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endogenous ties, such as business association memberships, implying less porosity 
and hence, theoretically at least, less entropy. ‘The ability of business to accomplish 
its goals’, Mizruchi argues, ‘must ultimately be studied in the context of the actions of 
other segments of society’ (1992). A firm’s structural location in the network may 
blind it to the opportunities afforded by the wider network structure. Uzzi (1996, 
1997) highlights the fundamental paradox of embeddedness: while economic action 
may benefit from initial increases in network tie strength, a threshold may be attained 
after which over-embeddedness may set in. Thus, although firms organized in 
networks have higher chances of success than firms that maintain looser, arm’s length 
relationships, the positive impact of embeddedness has a natural limit, beyond which 
firms begin to forego their adaptive capacity, and the effects start to reverse.  
This suggests that the more highly embedded nature of the French system, 
fostering system-wide efficiency, might potentially run the risk of over-
embeddedness, resulting in a possible loss of adaptive efficiency (Granovetter, 1985). 
The French, Crozier noted (1964: 52), traditionally have problems with bridge-
building relationships. While successful French connectors do have networks rich in 
structural holes (Burt et al., 2000; Zaheer and Bell, 2005), our research confirms a 
slight preference on the part of the French elite business community for more 
homogenous ties (or closure relationships), as against the more heterogeneous ties (or 
bridging relationships) favoured by the British. Against this, we demonstrate here that 
a significant proportion of the French elite act as boundary spanners, brokering 
relationships with others from more distant parts of the wider network (Collins-
Dogrul, 2012). Moreover, the integration of the French elite in the Eurozone, we 
concede, has potentially favoured bridge-building relationships while at the same time 
weakening national embeddedness (Howarth, 2013). This may contribute in turn to 
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the decline of indigenous interlocks whilst at the same time promoting the further 
internationalization of top management teams (Davoine and Ravasi, 2013; Hartmann, 
2011). The implications of this for organizational strategy, firm survival and 
economic performance form an agenda for future research.  
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Table 1: Higher Education and the French Business Elite* 
 
 
 
Institution Name 
 
 
 
Institution Type 
 
 
Year 
Founded 
 
 
No. of 
Attendances 
 
 
% of all 
Attendances 
École Polytechnique Engineering, 
Sciences and 
Mathematics 
1794 222        11.8 
Institut d’Études 
Politiques de Paris 
(IEP) (Sciences Po) 
Social Sciences 1872 174 9.3 
École National  
d’Administration 
(ENA) 
Public 
Administration 
1945 144 7.7 
HEC Paris Business and 
Management 
1881   96 5.1 
Université Paris 1 – 
Pantheon Sorbonne 
Law, Humanities 
and Social Sciences 
1252    93 4.9 
École des Mines de 
Paris (ENSMP) 
Engineering, 
Sciences, Economics 
and Management 
1783   73 3.9 
Université Paris 2 – 
Pantheon-Assas 
Law, Management, 
Social and 
Information Sciences 
1252   64 3.4 
Harvard Business 
School 
Business and 
Management  
1908   39 2.1 
ESSEC Business 
School 
Business and 
Management 
1907   38 2.0 
École Centrale Paris Engineering, Science 
and Technology 
1829   35 1.9 
Note:  *Data are available for 1,064 individuals with a combined attendance of 1,880, 
and a mean attendance rate of 1.77 attendances per head.  The top ten institutions 
account for 52.1% of all attendances. 
Source:  French business elites database.  This contains data on the 1,160 directors 
(executives and non-executives) of the Top 100 companies in France in 1998.  
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 Table 2: Corporate Connectors in France (n = 1,160) 
Director Type 
 
Single 
Board 
Connecting 
2-4 Boards* 
Connecting 
≥ 5 Boards* 
Total 
Executive Networker 
Number 
Row % 
 
      0 
      0.0 
 
    344 
      81.7 
 
     77 
     18.3 
 
  421 
   
Dedicated Executive 
Number 
Row % 
 
  433 
  100.0 
 
        0 
        0.0 
 
       0 
       0.0 
 
  433 
Non-Executive 
Networker 
Number 
Row % 
 
      0 
      0.0 
 
      81 
      75.0 
 
     27 
     25.0 
 
  108 
   
State Representative 
Number 
Row % 
 
    36 
    55.4 
 
      28 
      43.1 
 
       1 
       1.5 
 
  65 
   
Dedicated Non-Executive 
Number 
Row % 
 
   133 
   100.0 
 
        0 
        0.0 
 
       0 
       0.0 
 
  133 
All Directors 
Number 
Row % 
 
    602 
      51.9 
 
    453 
      39.1 
 
   105 
       9.1 
 
1160 
Note: Includes both Top 100 and Non Top 100 (medium or large) French and Non 
French companies. 
Source:  French business elites database.  This contains data on the 1,160 directors 
(executives and non-executives) of the Top 100 Companies in France in 1998. 
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Table 3: Connectivity by Non-Executive Appointments of the French Business Elite* 
(n = 1,160) 
Appointment by 
Organization 
Type 
Power Base* 
FB 
(n = 898) 
IB 
(n = 115) 
B&F 
(n = 60) 
L&P 
(n = 8) 
STATE 
(n = 65) 
ACAD 
(n = 14) 
Top 100 Co. 
Number** 
% in class  
 
    98 
    10.9 
 
       10 
         8.7 
 
    21 
    35.0 
 
       0 
       0.0  
 
    18 
    27.7 
 
      3 
    21.4 
Non Top 100 Co. 
Number** 
% in class 
  
  305 
    34.0 
 
     107 
       93.0 
 
    60 
  100.0 
 
        3 
     37.5 
 
     17 
    26.2 
 
      1 
      7.1 
Charity 
Number***  
% in class 
 
    64 
      7.1 
 
      35 
      30.4 
 
    10 
    16.7 
 
       1 
     12.5 
 
      5 
      7.7 
 
      2 
    14.3 
Public Body 
Number*** 
% in class 
 
  204 
    22.7 
 
      61 
      53.0 
 
    40 
    66.7 
 
       6 
     75.0 
 
     65 
   100.0 
 
    11 
    78.6 
Business Assoc. 
Number*** 
% in class  
 
  253 
    28.2 
 
      77 
      67.0 
 
    48 
    80.0 
 
       5 
     62.5 
 
     19 
     29.2 
 
      6 
    42.9 
Education 
Number*** 
% in class 
 
    96 
    10.7 
 
      44 
      38.3 
 
    19 
    31.7 
 
       2 
     25.0 
 
     24 
     36.9 
 
    11 
    78.6 
Culture/Sport 
      Number*** 
      % in class 
 
    64 
      7.1 
 
      35 
      30.4 
 
    10 
    16.7 
 
       1 
     12.5 
 
      5 
      7.7 
 
      2 
    14.3 
Notes: * Power base is defined by current primary association. FB = the French 
corporate sector; IB = business outside France; B&F = investment bank or the 
investment banking arm of a large bank; L&P = law or other profession; STATE = 
politics or public administration; ACAD = academic world. **Total number of 
appointments held. ***Number of individuals holding such an appointment. 
Source:  French business elites database.  This contains data on the 1,160 directors 
(executives and non-executives) of the Top 100 Companies in France in 1998.   
 
